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ΤΥΧΑ AT THE ORACLE OF ZEUS, DODONA*
1. The Question of ‘Good Luck’ in Oracular Consultations
I start with a phrase of farewell in a passage from Medea by Euripides (663–688). Aigeus and Medea 
are discussing the oracle that Aigeus has received from Delphi concerning his desire for children; he has 
been instructed not to loose the ‘bulging mouth of the wineskin until he reaches the height of Athens’. In 
stories reported by the later sources Plutarch (Theseus 3 and 6) and Apollodoros (3.15.6), we are told how 
the breaking of the oracle’s mandate not to have children until he reaches home results in Aigeus begetting 
Theseus in Troizen. It has been suggested that Euripides invented the oracle, but this seems unlikely, since 
an earlier epic version seems to have informed Plutarch’s account.1
As Medea and Aigeus talk, their conversation draws to the audience’s attention the diffi culties that 
emerge from an oracular consultation concerning the nature of the information about the future that an 
oracle provides and the challenges of trying to use this information for one’s advantage. The need for wis-
dom is mentioned several times: for example, Aigeus explains that the oracle’s words are (675) ‘too wise 
to interpret’, and that they require (677) ‘a wise mind’;2 and that he is going to visit Pittheus, whom Medea 
notes (686) ‘is wise and experienced in such matters as interpreting the god’s response’.3
Modern commentary on this passage has focused on examining two key questions. First, the dramatur-
gical problems of Aigeus’ presence in Corinth; and second, the nature of the oracle he has been given and 
how this plays out.4 In contrast, I want to draw attention to Medea’s fi nal words to Aigeus, when she bids 
him (688): ἀλλ̓  εὐτυχοίης καὶ τύχοις ὅσων ἐρᾷς. This can be translated as ‘Well, good luck attend you, 
and may you obtain what you desire.’5 In what follows I want to explain why I think this phrase is particu-
larly appropriate for Aigeus’ situation.
At fi rst sight, it may appear perverse of Medea to utter this phrase: scholars have generally understood 
ancient Greek oracles as providing some kind of helpful insight into what was fated to occur, enabling 
those who used them to take appropriate decisions. As Walter Burkert observes, ‘divination is an attempt to 
extend the realm of ratio … into the misty zones from which normal knowledge and experience is absent’.6 
But the interchange between Medea and Aigeus intimates that the process of employing the insight appar-
ently gained from an oracular response may have been more complicated. Specifi cally, although this is a 
literary example, evoking a mythical event, it prompts us to ask how those who actually consulted oracles 
regarded the role of luck (both good and bad) in the events about which they had asked. 
One way to explore this question is to examine evidence for attitudes to luck in historical oracular 
consultations. In this article, I will do this by analysing formulations employing τύχα in the texts of the 
(published) questions posed at the oracle of Zeus at Dodona. This analysis leads to the suggestion that the 
role of luck was not understood to be dispelled through processes of divination; rather, by including τύχα 
in a variety of different ways in their questions to the oracle, consultants demonstrated their recognition of 
its active role in their activities.7
* This article was written with the fi nancial support of the Leverhulme Trust, for which the author is extremely grateful.
1 Kovacs 1994, ad loc. cf. Burian and Shapiro 2011: 213.
2 675: σοφώτερ᾽ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα συμβαλεῖν ἔπη and 677: μάλιστ̓ , ἐπεί τοι καὶ σοφῆς δεῖται φρενός.
3 686: σοφὸς γὰρ ἁνὴρ καὶ τρίβων τὰ τοιάδε.
4 See for example Mastronarde 2002 and Mossman 2011, ad loc.
5 Kovacs 1994. 
6 See Burkert 2005: 3. 
7 In the part of this paper that focuses on the analysis of the Dodona tablets I mainly use the Doric spelling of tychē since 
it predominates in the relevant texts; throughout the rest of this paper, and, where relevant, to discuss specifi c inscriptions, I will 
use its more familiar Attic spelling.
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While focusing on the term τύχα in the question tablets offers a way to identify the presence of luck, 
it also introduces some complications to this analysis, since τύχη had a broad semantic range. Although, 
over time, τύχη came to be anthropomorphized as a goddess, it is often unclear whether ancient sources 
are using the word to indicate the divinity or one of a range of related meanings, e.g., the result of an event, 
coincidence, good or bad fortune, or success.8 In texts, both literary and epigraphic, the addition of prefi xes 
or adjectives may signal a particular quality of τύχη. One example, ἀγαθὰ τύχη, was perhaps originally 
created as a propitiatory title, intended to elicit good luck: in this case, the result became a goddess dis-
tinct from the goddess Τύχη, although it is hard to separate the two entirely.9 Indeed, as a goddess, Τύχη 
came to represent the (good) luck of different cities; and she could also appear in combination with other 
female fi gures, both mortal and divine, who had the power to grant prosperity.10 In this role, the concept 
of τύχη maintains its link with ideas of contingency; but at the same time τύχη could also evoke a sense 
of fate. This ambiguity can be observed in the use of the word to describe the occurrence of an event to a 
person or city: it communicates not only the particular coincidence of that event, but could also intimate 
the underlying, formative character of the person or city, which caused that event to occur.11 In visual and 
literary sources Τύχη was associated with other abstract personifi cations that expressed these ideas: on the 
one hand, the fragility of luck in the form of Καιρός, the moment of opportunity; and, on the other, the 
inescapable power of retribution, in the form of Νέμεσις.12
In sum, the word τύχη could indicate a goddess, or an abstract force, personifi ed or not. It could be 
used to mean, on the one hand, the desire for divine benevolence, and, on the other, notions of allotted fate; 
but it also conveyed a sense of profound ontological and epistemological uncertainty. This range of possible 
meanings is, as I will show, also found across the relevant texts of the published corpus of Dodona question 
tablets. In what follows, I examine all the examples of all forms of τύχα available in the texts published by 
Dakaris, Vokotopoulou and Christidis 2013 (DVC). These are then listed in an appendix, arranged accord-
ing to the article’s sections. I refer to these texts, in the article and appendix, by their DVC catalogue num-
bers, but without the prefi x ‘DVC’. Additional relevant texts, not listed by DVC, are taken from (and listed 
according to) the catalogue of Lhôte 2006; these are also included in the appendix.13
2. Invoking Luck and Good Luck
The syntactic pattern of ἀγαθὰ τύχα or τύχα alongside θεός or θεοί appears frequently in a number of the 
tablets. This kind of invocation is familiar, for example, from Athenian civic inscriptions: Tracy argued 
that the frequent occurrence of the phrase in Attic inscriptions, the appearance of ἀγαθὴ τύχη in the two 
dedications IG II2 4564 and 4610 (both by wealthy individuals), and her juxtaposition to major gods, sug-
8 See Hamdorf 1964: 97–100. The development of τύχη from nymph to goddess and the use of the term by different Greek 
writers to explore ideas of fate and contingency is examined in Eidinow 2011.
9 Parker 2003: 180 for propitiatory epithets and 175 for discussion of how different epithets used of the same god appear 
to have signalled ‘different gods’. On ἀγαθὰ τύχη see Sfameni Gasparro 1997: 89 for epigraphic evidence. Parker 1996: 231, 
n. 49 for ἀγαθὰ τύχη in Athens: IG II2 1195; IG II2 4564, and Athens, NM 1343: standing female fi gure, holding a cornucopia, 
labelled [ΑΓΑ]ΘΗ [ΤΥ]ΧΗ, on a votive relief (IG II2, 4644), c. 380–370. 
10 On the τύχαι of cities, see esp. Broucke 1994.
11 See, for example, the debate about Demosthenes’ τύχη in Demosthenes 18.252–275, replying to Aeschines 3, esp. 157 
(discussion Eidinow 2011: 144–150).
12 She is closely associated with Kairos in literary sources, e.g., Pl. Laws 709b, and found with Nemesis on the name-vase 
of the Heimarmene painter; LIMC s.v. Nemesis, p. 735. (A clear association has been formed between Τύχη and Nemesis by 
the Imperial period [see discussion Hornum 1993: 20,n. 2], but may date to the Hellenistic period or earlier, see for example, 
IG IV2, 1, 311 from Epidauros, dating to the 5th–4th century BCE.) 
13 As Lhôte 2014 has noted, DVC has neither the documents known before 1928, including those published by Carapanos, 
nor those that were discovered after 1959 during excavations by Dakaris. It is important to underline that this article does not 
set out to offer new readings of any texts, since this is already being done by an international team, led by Pierre Bonnechere, 
with the eventual aim of making them all available online. It is possible that the details of some of the texts used in this paper 
will be altered during that project. Nevertheless, I hope that the questions that this paper raises, about the presence and role of 
τύχα in the process of oracular consultation and the formulation of inquiries, will remain relevant.
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gests that ‘her worship was securely established’.14 It seems plausible to take the references to ἀγαθὰ τύχα 
and to τύχα in the Dodona texts in the same way. Their appearance in these texts might then be explained 
as simply recalling a common epigraphic habit among the writers, one that was felt to lend their questions 
the gravity of a civic inscription. However, it is also possible that the invocation of ἀγαθὰ τύχα or τύχα in 
these texts indicated more than this, and that consultants were referring to either the perceived but invisible 
presence of these goddesses, or perhaps even their material presence, as evidence relating to other oracu-
lar sanctuaries suggests. For example, Simplikios, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, reports that 
Τύχη and Apollo (referred to as Loxias) were both invoked at Delphi: ἐν ∆ελφοῖς δὲ καὶ προκατῆρχεν 
ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ‘ὦ Τύχη καὶ Λοξία, τῷδέ τινι θεμιστεύεις;’ (‘at Delphi the pre-amble to the inquiry 
was “O Luck and Apollo, will you answer this request?”’).15 Granted, Simplikios was writing in the sixth 
century CE; nevertheless, it is intriguing that what he describes as a common invocation at Delphi should 
be (as we will see) so similar to certain of the formulae found in the Dodona question texts. 
There is no material evidence for a cult of Τύχη at Delphi, although it has, famously, been argued that 
there was a lot oracle at Delphi, and a dice oracle in the Korykian cave above Delphi, both of which were 
activities that could be more obviously associated with Τύχη.16  However, archaeological evidence indicates 
the material presence of Τύχη at other oracular sanctuaries. For example, at the oracle of Asklepios, in 
Pergamon, the Lex Sacra specifi es the procedures that must take place before incubation.17 The evening 
before, the fi nal offerings made are to Τύχη, Μνημοσύνη and Θέμις (ll. 9–11 and 26–29): cakes to Τύχη 
and Μνημοσύνη outside the chamber and a cake to Θέμις within the chamber. Alexia Petsalis-Diomidis has 
suggested that ‘pilgrims propitiated Tyche in the hope that she would grant them contact with Asklepios – a 
favour not granted to all incubants’, drawing a parallel with the procedures at Trophonios’ oracle at Leba-
deia, where the consultant would stay in a house sacred to Ἀγαθὸς ∆αίμων and Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη.18 It is a coher-
ent explanation of the ritual, suggesting that Τύχη was perceived as playing the role of a divine ‘gatekeeper’, 
mediating access between consultant and oracular god.19 But it is also possible that this role went beyond 
mediation, and that, as with the Delphian invocation, these ritual activities indicate that luck, personifi ed in 
the form of Τύχη, was understood to be a signifi cant force in in the process of oracular inquiry itself.
Evidence for a cult of Τύχη is also found at the oracular sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma. For example, 
the following inscription, dating to the third century CE, records a question posed by one offi cial, Hermias, 
concerning the inclusion of ‘the’ altar of Τύχη in the altar circle:
Ταμίας Ἑρμίας ἐρωτᾷ· / Ἐπεὶ ὁ τῆς Τύχης βωμὸς / τῆς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ σου συν/κέκλειται ἐν 
τῷ λεγομέ//νῳ παραδείσῳ περιοικο/δομημένων αὐτῷ οἰκι/ῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολ/λοῖς οὐ 
θεωρεῖται, πότε/ρον λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον // τῇ τε θεῷ προσφιλὲς με/τὰ τῶν λοιπῶν θεῶν καὶ / 
τοῦτον τὸν βωμὸν πε/ριβωμίζεσθαι ἢ μή; Ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησεν·
// Πάντας χρὴ τειμᾶν μά/καρας πάντας τε σέβεσ/θαι
Comptroller Hermias asks ‘Since the altar of Τύχη in your sanctuary is enclosed in the so-
called paradeisos, where houses have been built around it, and on that account many people do 
not see it, is it better and preferable and pleasing to the goddess that this altar also be placed in 
the altar circle with the other gods or is it not?’
Response: ‘You must honour all blessed deities and reverence all.’
14 Tracy 1994: 244.
15 Simplikios, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 2. 4.75 [Arist. p. 196 b 5.10] = 9.333.15 Diels (trans. Fleet 2014).
16 Amandry 1950: 29–36, 84–85, 232–233.
17 Wörrle 1969.
18 Petsalis-Diomidis 2010: 231. Lebadeia: Paus. 9.39.5.
19 Petsalis-Diomidis also draws a parallel between the drinking of the water of Λήθη and Μνημοσύνη at Lebadeia, and 
the propitiation of Μνημοσύνη at Pergamon: both seem to refer to the visitor’s desire to be able to recollect what they experi-
enced after the event.
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The inscription makes reference to an existing altar of Τύχη (ὁ τῆς Τύχης βωμὸς / ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ σου), which 
presumably received such dedications.20 And Fontenrose has suggested that this initial altar of Τύχη is 
referred to, as an altar of Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη, in the Seleukid letter of 288/287 sent to the demos and council of 
Miletos, and describing offerings made to the gods of the sanctuary of Apollo in Didyma.21
With these comparisons in mind, it is worth noting that among the texts from Dodona are a number that 
include ἀγαθὰ τύχα or τύχα ἀγαθά (see App. 1a) alongside the gods; but also texts that invoke only ἀγαθὰ 
τύχα or τύχα ἀγαθά (App. 1b); and there are also texts that appear to address τύχα alone (App. 2), includ-
ing some that comprise only the word τύχα (e.g. 2936B and Lhôte 33B), which could be either a request for 
good luck or a laconic invocation. The relationship between ἀγαθὰ τύχα and τύχα in these texts remains 
puzzling: for example, are the texts that invoke θεὸς τύχα (App. 1c) doing so in order to invoke τύχα as a 
divinity, or to supplicate god and luck, or are they appealing to god to grant them good luck? 
A number of texts (App. 2: 2440, 2936B, and 3276B) suggest that τύχα on her own could be invoked. 
That she is different from ἀγαθὰ τύχα seems implied by a text such as 2093A (App. 3) in which ἀγαθὰ 
τύχα occurs alongside θεός at the opening of the question but τύχα in the dative case appears alongside 
Zeus Naios and Dione, among the list of divinities to whom the consultant’s question is addressed; this 
same trio of gods is also invoked in 80A. In Lhôte 141Ba, the goddess appears alongside a different set of 
supernatural entities – Herakles, Erechtheus, and Athena Patroa – as the recipient of a libation (this ritual 
may be the subject of the question, but this is not clear from the text). Taking the example from Didyma 
discussed above as a parallel, these latter texts could potentially indicate the perceived presence, or even a 
material presence, of τύχα or ἀγαθὰ τύχα in the sanctuary of Dodona. 
It is unclear at what stage in the consultation process these texts were inscribed, or by whom, so it 
is diffi cult to draw any conclusions about what they may reveal about the state of mind of the individu-
al consultant. However, it is worth noting that the placing of the invocation in the text could vary: as an 
example, restoration of ll. 1–2 of Lhôte 92A (App. 1d), means that TY followed by A is to be read τύ(χα) 
ἀ-/[γαθά]. That this phrase occurs not at the beginning of the text, but after the (restored) name and verb 
of inquiry, suggests a less formulaic and, for that reason, more personal approach to the creation of the 
question itself. Moreover, there is also evidence that some consultants sought to personalise the opening 
formula: for example, in text Lhôte 22A (App. 4), the apparently formulaic listing of Θεός. Τύχαν ἀγαθάν 
is followed by the name of the oracle consultant Ἀντιμάχωι; the name is then repeated in the following line 
at the beginning of the main question, ἐπερωτᾶι Ἀντίμαχος. This brings us to texts that do not (or not only) 
invoke τύχα, but also request it/her.
3. Requests for Luck
The invocation in Lhôte 22Α appears, in part, to resemble an appeal to a personal good luck; it may also 
be a request for good luck. Another text, 2510 (this and the other texts in this section are in App. 4), con-
veys this idea more clearly, including both an invocation for good luck and a request that it be granted to 
the consultant, alongside health and safety, among other benefi ts. A bolder request is found in 3453B: a 
request for the very best luck. Finally, in texts 95A, 2482B, and 2982A, the phrase is formulated in the 
dative (ἀγαθεῖ τύχει, τύχαι ἀγαθᾶι and ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθᾶ⟨ι⟩ τύχα[ι]), respectively. In the former two examples, 
the dative appears to mean either with or for good luck. In 95A, the text is relatively clear: the reference to 
ἀγαθεῖ τύχει appears apart from and in a different case from Zeus Naios and Dione and those gods who 
dwell with them, who are invoked at the beginning of the question.22 In 2482B, the text appears to be an 
inquiry about the paying of a sum of money (τὰν / ὑστάταν φορὰν μνᾶν), and although the words are hard 
to read, the dative case of τύχαι ἀγαθᾶι suggests that the consultants, Alkidamos and Mastaka, are look-
20 Inquiry of Hermias: Tuchelt 1971: 98, 99, ll. 15–17 (Günther); text and trans. Fontenrose 1988: 202, no. 27.
21 Fontenrose 1988: 161. For the text, see Welles 1934: 33, no. 5, and for the latest edition, Bringmann and von Steuben 
1995: 334, KNr.: 280[E], ll. 31–32.
22 The long vowels have been shortened: see Buck 1955: 36.
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ing for good luck as the reward or recompense for this action.23 The text of 2982Α provides a preposition, 
which helps to make sense of the text: ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθᾶ⟨ι⟩ τύχα[ι]. The consultant appears to want to know if the 
offerings will bring good luck.
These texts suggest that consultants may have asked for good luck on its own, or inquired about it 
as the result of particular (ritual) activities. This also seems likely to be the case with a number of other 
texts: these are too fragmentary to offer much sense, but they include τύχα in the accusative (singular) 
case (1158B, 1223A, 2488A, 2707A, 3390A, 3453B; one text, 799B, includes τύ χας, perhaps a plural form, 
maybe a genitive singular case).
4. The Potential for Luck
It is more diffi cult to conclude what those questions may have been in which τύχα appears in the nomina-
tive case and its location in the text leads us to think it is probably not an invocation (the texts discussed 
here are in App. 5). 1436A and 2734B both seem to place τύχα close to a name (albeit restored), which 
suggests that, in each case, the τύχα refers to the luck of a particular person.24
Other texts concern the potential for τύχα arising from a situation described in a conditional phrase: 
75 offers the clearest example of this, where the question seems to turn on the possibility of τύχα from a 
particular activity: DVC suggest the care of an animal of some kind. In 252A, the word, albeit restored, sits 
close to an interrogative phrase (here largely restored) familiar from other oracular questions, λώϊο[ν] καὶ 
[ἄμεινον; it contains a dependent clause, potentially concerned with farming. 
However, other such occurrences of τύχα in the nominative occur without such helpful details: a num-
ber (e.g. 393B, 1510A, 2002A and 2830B) are simply too fragmentary to enable us to make a likely inter-
pretation, although the gist of the question is clear in the case of 2830B, which seems to concern children. 
The idea of potentially ‘having’ luck is also possibly the meaning of Lhôte 37, which, as Lhôte discusses, 
may be a nominal phrase for the expression, ϝ ν τυνχάν  found in Lhôte 35A.25
5. Being Lucky
An alternative reading of 75/M82 (given in DVC) suggests, in place of τύχα, the term τυχα(ῖον), and this 
brings us to question texts about ‘being lucky’, that is, questions that appear to make τύχα a desirable qual-
ity that can be possessed by things, situations, or people; the texts discussed in this section are in App. 6. 
Sometimes this idea of ‘being lucky’ is expressed with an impersonal phrase. Thus, if the restoration 
of the text is correct, 2410 seems to be asking about a co-habiting situation, and whether it will be ‘lucky’ 
(τυχαῖον) for the consultant. Something similar seems to be the case in 39A, which possibly refers to travel 
to a city;26 and in 1340A, which concerns farming.27 It also seems to be used in this way in 1088A, 3005A 
and 3745A, although these are too fragmentary for their subject matter to be clear. In 3192A the usual inter-
rogative formula of oracle questions, λώϊον καὶ ἄμεινον (‘better and more good’) is rewritten to include the 
idea of luckiness: τ/υχα ιότερο[ν] καὶ λώϊον. 
In other questions, ‘being lucky’ qualifi es a particular noun: e.g., if Lhôte’s reading is preferred, then in 
31A it may refer to a marriage arrangement. It may also be used to qualify a person: the clearest example of 
this is in 221B, where the term seems to describe the consultant; it is in the feminine form suggesting that 
this visitor to Dodona was a woman. 3289A may offer another, similar example, although the text is hard 
to read. Finally, the conceptual fi eld of τύχα is further illustrated by another phrase for being lucky: 4046A 
uses a metaphor of movement, τύχηι τυχε[ῖν ‘meeting luck’. 
23 Taking Mastaka as a woman’s name, cf. the male names, Μαστακίς, Μάστακος (LGPN II and IIIA); 3381B may also 
be an example of the dative case.
24 Similar to 1223A, see above, where τύχαν appears to belong to a person, whose name is in the genitive.
25 Lhôte 2006: 101.
26 The Akarnanian polis Θύρρειον; see IG IV2 1, 95. 16 (and cf. texts 1523B: [- - - ] ΘΥΡΕ and 1729A: ΘΥΡΕΙΟΝ). 
27 As the editors of the text suggest and Méndez-Dosuna (2016: 128) agrees, 1340A should be combined with 1339A ἐν 
Φαρκαδόνι.
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6. All about Luck
One of the ways in which consultants structure their enquiries at Dodona is to include a περί phrase, usually 
at the beginning of their question, which identifi es the topic of their consultation. It is striking that, as well 
as asking questions about specifi c areas of daily life, which acknowledge the role of τύχα in the outcome, 
the consultants at Dodona also ask about τύχα itself, using this περί structure, e.g., in App. 7, 1810A and 
3950A, both ask ‘about luck’. 
Only in one example, Lhôte 21, does the question explicitly mention good luck, but it seems highly like-
ly that this is the type of luck that is the subject of most of these inquiries. It is something to be requested 
from the gods: a number of examples ask to which of the gods or heroes (1370A, 1608B, 3771) they should 
pray in order to obtain τύχα. Those questions that ask περὶ παντυχίας (94, 3771 and Lhôte 5) also seem 
likely to be about gaining good luck – this time in every area of one’s life. 
The same idea of a good outcome is also implicit in, for example, 1370A, which seems to about the luck 
‘of money’ (we might say ‘the chance of money’) and those texts that mention other desirable outcomes 
(3950A and 2374A). Some of these texts closely associate τύχα to a person’s name not only as part of the 
question (1290A and 1370A), but seemingly with a sense of an individual’s personal luck (1187A and 2146B; 
possibly 2374A). 
7. Embracing Luck
Recent scholarship on ancient Greek religion does not often discuss the pervasive presence of concepts of 
fate, luck and fortune, preferring instead to focus on cult practice. This may be because of a sense that, as 
Robert Parker has stated in his recent overview of ancient Greek religion, ‘it is diffi cult to bring the two 
things together within a single fi eld of argument’.28 These texts from Dodona may offer a case study of a 
ritual that explicitly included a role for τύχα. It may be that ἀγαθὰ τύχα and τύχα and its cognates were 
used without attention by the consultants at Dodona, but the analysis here suggests otherwise: they indicate 
that τύχα was part of the conscious, explicit assessment of the outcome of the uncertain future that took 
place in an oracular consultation. Far from trying to ignore or dispel the idea of luck, these texts reveal 
how consultants could craft their questions so as to engage with τύχα. The multiplicity of ways in which 
these questions refer to τύχα suggests that consultants recognised a variety of roles that τύχα could play in 
shaping future outcomes.29 I have argued elsewhere that the use of τύχα in literary sources indicates that 
there were shared cultural models of this entity, which people might draw on in different ways, according 
to their context.30 The consultants at Dodona seem to have employed the concept in a similar way in their 
questions, highlighting different meanings of τύχα and allocating her/it different roles.31 
As noted above, in ancient Greek literary and epigraphic sources it is often diffi cult to distinguish 
between luck and good luck (τύχα and ἀγαθὰ τύχα), and in many of the Dodona question texts, τύχα does 
seem to stand primarily for good luck. However, the texts also reveal some differences in the use of these 
two terms. Those questions concerned with ἀγαθὰ τύχα are relatively straightforward: they invoke ἀγαθὰ 
τύχα or request it. In contrast, τύχα is cast in a greater variety of roles: she/it is not only invoked and sim-
ply requested; the questions also explore her/its potential presence and refer to her/its personalised nature. 
τύχα appears both as an abstract concept and as a divine entity: for some it/she is desired as an outcome 
28 Parker (2011: xii). Parker is explaining why he did not include these themes in his discussion of Greek religion: in this 
context, he aligns ‘fate’ variously with theodicy, divine justice, and human responsibility; he does not mention τύχη, ‘chance’ 
or ‘luck’.
29 As Heimlich (2010: 173) observes, Iles Johnston (2005: 300) does in some places refer to the indeterminacy inherent 
in oracular consultation, but then, as he puts it, she ‘jumps off the high wire into the safety net … by claiming that clients of 
Apollo’s dice oracles were trying to domesticate the unpredictable (we would say “random”) forces that drove both their dice 
throws and their lives’ (citing Johnston 2005: 15). Heimlich himself goes on to argue that the patrons of dice oracles did not try 
to tame chance: ‘Rather, if they were attempting to domesticate anything it was themselves, in the sense of becoming at home 
in the cosmos by orienting themselves in relation to chance.’
30 On shared cultural models of τύχη, see Eidinow 2011.
31 On the idea of the cultural model applied to τύχη esp. in specifi c ancient authors see Eidinow 2011, esp. 8–11, 66–75, 
91–93, 117, 136–141, 153–162.
 Τύχα at the Oracle of Zeus, Dodona 97
(‘good luck’); for others, it/she helps to realise the future; for still others it/she is one of the (divine) sourc-
es of information about what may come to pass. In addition, τύχα retains her more sinister aspect: a less 
cheerful form of luck appears in 2074A (App. 8), where the questioner appears to be suffering from bad 
luck. She (the participle, ἱεμένα, indicates that the consultant is female) asks if she has yet endured enough 
from τύχα.  
8. And So … Good Luck!
I return to Medea’s fi nal words to Aigeus, when she bids him (688): ἀλλ̓  εὐτυχοίης καὶ τύχοις ὅσων ἐρᾷς. 
This can be translated as ‘Well, good luck attend you, and may you obtain what you desire.’32 The fi rst 
half of the phrase is a formulaic way of saying goodbye: the speaker wishes his interlocutor good fortune, 
using a verb in the optative mood, which is generally used for a wish. The phrase is found, for example, in 
Euripides’ Alkestis, where Admetos wishes Herakles (1153): ἀλλ̓  εὐτυχοίης, νόστιμον δ᾽ ἔλθοις δρόμον, 
‘May you have good fortune and run your homeward course’; and in Iphigeneia at Aulis, as Klytaimnestra 
interrogates Agamemnon about the details of their daughter’s marriage (716): ἀλλ̓  εὐτυχοίτην. τίνι δ᾽ ἐν 
ἡμέρᾳ γαμεῖ; ‘Happiness attend the pair! Which day will he marry her?’
But in these two examples, the irony of the phrase is inescapable. In each case, the fi rst half of the verse, 
with its innocent request for good luck, is foreshadowed by the audience’s knowledge of the implications 
of the second half of the verse. This varies in strength: in Alkestis, the irony is relatively light. Herakles is 
rushing away because he must perform his labours. We are aware that he will be successful; nevertheless, 
the audience’s knowledge darkens Admetos’ reference to Herakles’ ‘journey home’. The second example is 
more complex and carries a double irony. Klytaimnestra has not yet understood the real nature of the wed-
ding that Agamemnon plans; nor does she grasp the signifi cance of her husband’s response to her question 
of timing. Agamemnon is indeed about to offer this goddess a sacrifi ce: not one that precedes a marriage in 
order to protect the new bride, but the bride herself.33 This interchange in fact introduces a second reference 
to τύχη. Klytaimnestra’s earlier wish for good luck is followed by a more ambiguous and sinister mention 
of τύχη in Aga memnon’s response: ‘I am about to. That is the very thing (ταύτῃ τύχῃ) I was engaged in.’34 
As commentators have noted, Klytaimnestra could interpret this τύχη as meaning ‘position, condition of 
affairs’, while Agamemnon could be referring to the sacrifi ce of Klytaimnestra’s daughter.35 This ambi-
guity of meaning is then clarifi ed in a later, similar interchange between Agamemnon and Klytaimnestra: 
Agamemnon says (1136) ‘O Fate revered, O Destiny, and my fortune’; to which Klytaimnestra replies 
(1137), ‘Yes, and mine and hers too; the three share one bad fortune.’36 
These examples suggest that these seemingly habitual phrases about ‘good luck’ may bear closer exam-
ination. Similarly, in Medea, when Medea wishes Aigeus good luck, the second half of the phrase can be 
read as conveying further meaning, although not perhaps as blatantly as the examples above. It suggests 
that Medea considers, explicitly, that there is some uncertainty about what is to come next. Mastronarde has 
suggested that this concerns Medea’s own future: there is something about the way this phrase is used that 
prompts Aigeus to ask Medea about her own situation.37 While agreeing that this is one aspect of this inter-
change, I suggest it is only a part: Medea is also expressing a view about the outcome of Aigeus’ consultation 
of the oracle, and, both in that context and more generally, about mankind’s inherent and inescapable rela-
tionship with luck. As I hope this article has demonstrated, this sentiment was perfectly suited to the consul-
tation of oracles, where τύχα (rather than the inevitability of fate) was recognised as a pervasive presence. 
32 Kovacs 1994. 
33 As Parker (2005: 441, n. 94) states, the goddess here is likely to be Artemis because of the requirement to sacrifi ce to 
her before marriage, as much as because of the context-specifi c reference to this divinity. Artemis’ connection to the moon is 
less clear than that of Diana (as Budin 2016: 60, 159 observes) and it seems more likely that the sequence of ideas concerns the 
acts that will insure good fortune for the marriage, and especially the bride.
34 719: μέλλω· ’πὶ ταύτῃ καὶ καθέσταμεν τύχῃ.
35 England 1891, ad loc.
36 1136: ὦ πότνια μοῖρα καὶ τύχη δαίμων τ᾽ ἐμός and 1137: κἀμός γε καὶ τῆσδ ,̓ εἷς τριῶν δυσδαιμόνων.
37 Mastronarde 2002, 688n.
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